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Abstract 
We develop four experimental markets to examine how individuals 
respond to risk: self-protection and self-insurance in both 
private and collective auctions, First, we find evidence that 
the mechanism used to reduce risk is important. Results indicate 
that the upper and lower bounds on value were elicited by the 
private self-protection and the collective self-insurance 
markets. Second, the robustness of these results declined with 
low probability lotteries. We find further evidence that 
individuals overestimate the impact of low probability events. 
Overestimation decreased, however, with repeated market exposure. 
Third, the four markets induced rapid value formation. Usually 
only one or two additional market trials were necessary before an 
individual's perception and valuation of reduced risk stabilized. 
1. Introduction 
Two elements define risk: probability and severity. 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) recognized that risk can be reduced by 
decreasing either element, privately or collectively. They 
define decreased probability as self-protection; decreased 
severity as self-insurance. Recent extensions of self-protection 
and self-insurance models have illustrated their wide 
applicability and importance to the theory of individual choice 
under risk [see for example Hiebert (1983), Centner and Wetzstein 
(1987), Shogren and crocker (1989a)]. 
Although it is now generally recognized that self-protection 
and self-insurance exist, minimal attention has been given to 
systematically evaluating their comparative impact on individual 
response to risk. Given Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) work on 
choice under alternative decision frames, one might suspect that 
how a risk is reduced may be as important as what risk is 
reduced. The purpose of this paper is to examine how individuals 
respond to risk that is reduced either through private or 
collective self-protection or self-insurance. We construct an 
experimental design that incorporates self-protection and self-
insurance into four markets with alternative risk reduction 
mechanisms. For each market, the experiment elicited individual 
valuations of four risks in both hypothetical and nonhypothetical 
lotteries repeated over ten market trials. 
The experimental design captures three issues basic to 
decision making under risk. First, we examine whether the risk 
reduction mechanism matters to valuation. Individuals confronted 
with risk have an assortment of ex ante reduction mechanisms to 
decrease the probability or severity of an ex post monetary or 
nonmonetary loss. For example, an individual exposed to 
potentially contaminated drinking water can privately reduce the 
probability of illness by purchasing a water filter, or he can 
contribute to a collective scheme to filter the water in a 
centralized location. Alternatively, the individual can 
privately or collectively reduce the severity of the hazard 
through preventive medical care, nutrition, or exercise. 
Although psychologists have discovered that alternative 
means of framing equivalent problems lead to systematic 
differences in choice, economists have previously not addressed 
whether alternative risk reduction mechanisms affect valuation. 
our results suggest the mechanism matters. Reducing risk by 
altering the probability or severity of an undesirable event 
through a private mechanism induced significantly different value 
estimates. Private self-protection was preferred to self-
insurance. In addition, private mechanisms were valued 
significantly greater than the collective mechanisms for both 
self-protection and self-insurance. Generally, the upper bound 
of value is generated by the private provision of self-
protection. The lower bound of value is obtained by the 
collective provision of self-insurance. Consequently, future 
attempts to value risk should consider all alternative reduction 
mechanisms to capture a more comprehensive view of economic 
value. 
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The second basic issue explored is how individuals value 
reductions over a range of risks. Both psychologists and 
economists have uncovered evidence that individuals are 
oversensitive to changes in the probabilities of low probability 
events [see Machina (1983) for overview]. If individuals over-
estimate the value of reducing risk associated with low 
probability events, then more resources will be devoted to risk 
reduction than is economically efficient. To determine whether 
the subjects over estimate low probability events, a range of 
risks is examined. Four binary lotteries are constructed given a 
fixed loss and gain with probability of a loss being 1%, 10%, 
20%, and 40%. To compare across lotteries, we examine the 
individual's risk premium payment. We also consider how the risk 
premiums respond to the alternative reduction mechanisms over 
repeated market trials. 
We find further evidence that individuals overestimate the 
impacts of low probability events as evidenced by relatively 
large initial risk premium payments. The initial valuations do 
not conform to the expected utility requirement of linearity in 
probabilities as reflected by individual willingness to pay an 
excessive risk premium for the 1% lottery period. Although this 
is not encouraging since many risks are less than 1% per year or 
lifetime, risk premiums decrease significantly with repeated 
market interactions, especially in the self-insurance risk 
reduction markets. 
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Finally, the third issue examined is how value formation for 
risk reduction is affected by repeated exposure to the market. 
It is well documented that individuals misperceive risky events 
in static one-shot environments. The "sharpness" of prior 
information about the risk has little chance to improve without 
sequential decisions which involve learning (see Viscusi (1979)]. 
As noted by Hayek (1945), the market provides the opportunity for 
an individual to update prior misperceptions since irrelevant 
information has been forced out. To determine whether repeated 
exposure to the market significantly influences value formation, 
the experiment is designed such that each risk is reduced over 
twelve repeated trials. The first trial is the static, one-shot 
hypothetical reduction often used in nonmarket valuation 
experiments. The next ten trials are nonhypothetical market 
auctions for self-protection or self-insurance. The final trial 
is the "experienced" hypothetical risk reduction. 
We find that values form rapidly in all experimental 
markets. The rapid value formation indicates that learning about 
risk through the market does occur. The results indicate that 
the bias associated with the misperception of risk is greatly . 
reduced with only one or two additional market trials. The 
market for risk reduction induces the process necessary for 
stable perceptions and values, without additional external 
information. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the 
experimental design. The experimental results are outlined in 
Section 3, and th~ conclusions in Section 4. 
2. Experimental Design: Self-Protection, Self-Insurance, and 
the Psychology of Risk Reduction 
The experimental design captures three fundamental issues in 
the theory of choice under risk: how individuals value risk 
given alternative reduction mechanisms, how individuals value 
reductions over a range of risks, and how these values are 
affected by repeated market trials. Consider each issue in more 
detail. First, we examine if the risk reduction mechanisms 
matter. Psychologists have discovered that choice and values are 
systematically influenced by alternative means of representing or 
framing an identical problem (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1981)]. 
This evidence makes it increasingly difficult to accept on faith 
that alternative risk reduction mechanisms do not influence 
individual value formation. To test whether alternative 
mechanisms matter, we construct an experimental market to 
quantify the framing of reduced risk. The experimental market 
was framed so that each subject would value reduced risk through 
one of four mechanisms: private self-protection, private self-
insurance, collective self-protection, and collective self-
insurance. 
Given one can discriminate between self-protection and self-
insurance expenditures, is one reduction scheme preferred to 
another? current economic theory yields an ambiguous answer. 
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Boyer and Dionne (1983) argue that a risk averse consumer will 
always prefer private self-insurance to self-protection since the 
former is more efficient in reducing an equivalent risk. 
According to Chang and Ehrlich (1985), however, self-insurance 
will not be preferred to self-protection since both must be 
equally desirable in terms of marginal contribution to expected 
utility. In our experimental design, the individual purchasing 
self-protection is guaranteed a monetarY gain, while the 
purchaser of self-insurance is not. Self-protection reduces the 
probability of a loss to zero, implying a 100% chance of 
receiving the gain. Self-insurance, however, reduces the 
severity of the probable loss to zero, but does not alter the 
probability of receiving the monetarY gain. Therefore, a risk-
averse or risk-neutral individual will value self-protection more 
highly than self-insurance [see Shogren (1988) for the proof]. 
In terms of private versus collective risk reduction, if the 
individual can always produce a given reduction at less cost 
privately than collectively, he will do so [see Shogren and 
Crocker (1989b)]. The individual's preference for collective or 
private reduction will depend on the perceived productivity of. 
his payment. The collective reduction may prove more efficient 
given scale economies since many private actions are too 
expensive or complicated to be economically feasible. If the 
individual perceives excessive free riding behavior, however, 
collective action will not be valued as highly as private action. 
It follows that large collective values exist only when the 
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individual is an inefficient private self-protector, or if he is 
uninformed about private opportunities. 
The second issue in experimental design is how individuals 
value reductions over a range of risk. Both psychologists and 
economists have observed systematic violations of the "linearity 
in probabilities" property of the independence axiom in expected 
utility theory (see Machina (1982, 1983), Covello (1984)]. 
Studies have found individuals oversensitive to changes in the 
probability of low risk events, and undersensitive to high risk 
events (e.g., Fischhoff et al. (1984), Viscusi and Magat (1987)]. 
This violation is particularly damaging since it implies non-
recovery of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
function. To examine this issue, a range of lotteries was 
constructed to determine if and how behavior in low risk 
lotteries differs from behavior in high risk lotteries. We use a 
binary lottery to construct the risks (~, -$L; (1 - ~), +$G), 
where ~ (0 ~ ~ ~ 1) is the probability of a monetary loss $L, and 
(1 - ~) is the probability of a monetary gain $G. In each 
experimental market, subjects were asked to report separate bids 
stating the maximum he or she would be willing to pay to reduce 
four levels of risk (1%, 10%, 20%, 40%). 
The third issue in experimental design is to consider how 
individual values respond to repeated exposure to self-protection 
and self-insurance opportunities. Expenditures to reduce risk 
are rarely in terms of one-shot lifetime contributions. An 
individual's first market expenditure is often significantly 
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different from his last. The first expenditure is based on prior 
information that is often incorrect. From a Bayesian 
perspective, repeated exposure to the market will allow the 
individual to update his perception and, therefore, his value of 
a reduction in risk [see Viscusi (1979)]. A market influences 
individual learning of value due to the learning-feedback 
environment of a repetitive framework. Therefore, to determine 
how multiple market exposure to alternative risk reduction 
mechanisms affects value formation, we explore the dynamics of 
repeated market trials compared to a static one-shot response. 
The experiment began by eliciting an inexperienced 
hypothetical bid (UEHB) for each level of risk. The UEHB bid was 
not binding, did not influence take-home pay, and the lotteries 
were not resolved. Next, ten nonhypothetical bids were elicited 
in sequentially repeated trials for each risk (Tl-TlO). These 
ten bids were binding, did influence take-home pay, and the 
lotteries were resolved. Finally, an experienced hypothetical 
bid (EHB) was obtained. In all each subject reported 48 bids. 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design and economic 
hypotheses. The actual instructions for the private self-
protection-market are in the Appendix. See Shogren (1988) for a 
detailed description of the experimental design, and the 
instructions for the other experimental markets. 1 
3. Experimental Results 
One hundred and twenty subjects participated in the 
experiment. All subjects were recruited from the undergraduate 
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program at Appalachian state University. 2 Five experiment 
sessions with six subjects each were run for each of the four 
asset markets. Table 2 summarizes the results for risk 
reductions for all four asset markets and levels of risk (lottery 
periods). 3 The first two columns describe the four experimental 
asset markets and the four probabilities (risks) of a potential 
loss in assets. The table reports two measures of central 
tendency for each bid (inexperienced hypothetical bid, average 
nonhypothetical bid over ten trials, and experienced hypothetical 
bid); the estimated mean and median in dollars; and one measure 
of dispersion, the estimate variance. 4 
3.1 Risk Valuation Is sensitive to the Risk Reduction Mechanism 
To examine the impact of alternative risk reduction 
mechanisms we first compare the private and collective markets, 
and then compare the self-protection and self-insurance markets. 
The private risk reduction markets were organized as a Vickrey 
sealed-bid second-price auction [Vickrey (1961)]. Each subject 
competes for the purchase of protection or insurance. The winner 
is the subject with the highest bid who pays the second highest 
bid for a 100% reduction in risk. Both the winner and second bid 
were posted as the only public information for each auction. 5 
The collective risk reduction markets were organized as 
modified sealed-bid Smith Auctions (Smith (1980)]. The Smith 
Auction works as follows. Each subject provides a bid to reduce 
risk to zero. If the sum of the bids equals or exceeds the costs 
of providing a 100% reduction in risk, then an adjusted (or 
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average) bid is posted as the reigning price of protection or 
insurance. Acceptance by the collective of the price occurs only 
if all members ag:r:ee .. If at least one subject disagrees, then 
everyone is subject to a controlled draw of the lottery. If the 
sum of bids does not exceed costs, then a controlled draw of the 
lottery occurs. 6 
Table 3 shows that the experienced hypothetical bid (EHB) 
for private risk reductions exceeded the bid for collective 
reductions (with one exception). Using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
we did not accept the hypothesis that the mean EHB bid for the 
respective private risk reduction through self-protection or 
self-insurance were derived from the same parental distribution 
as the collective reductions. 
Table 3 also indicates that for the four risks the mean bids 
for private self-protection exceeded that for private self-
insurance. A Wilcoxon rank sum test at the 95% confidence level 
indicates that the experienced hypothetical bids for private 
self-protection are significantly different from the bids for 
private self-insurance for all lottery periods. Respondents were 
willing to pay more for the private mechanism that influenced 
probability than the mechanism that influenced severity. This 
result contradicts Boyer and Dionne's (1983) claim that private 
self-insurance will be preferred to self-protection. The result 
supports Shogren's (1988) argument that since self-protection 
guarantees a monetary gain, it will be preferred to self-
insurance, which only guarantees that one will not suffer a loss. 
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Respondents were not willing to pay more, however, for collective 
mechanisms that influence probability relative to severity. A 
Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates the experienced hypothetical 
bids for collective self-protection are not statistically 
significant from collective self-insurance for all probability 
periods. 
In general, the mechanism, whether private or collective or 
whether probability or severity is reduced, is important when 
eliciting an economic value for a reduction in risk. Our results 
indicate the upper bound on value was the private, self-
protection market. The lower bound on value was the collective, 
self-insurance market. 
The disparity in private and collective values may be due to 
the free-riding incentive in the collective mechanism. 
Individuals have an incentive to under-report willingness to pay 
for nonhypothetical reduced risk. 7 As noted by Bennett (1987), 
strategic behavior between collective bidders often occurs in 
Smith Auctions even though collective optimality is attained. 
Smith {1980) found that although optimal aggregate levels of 
public good were provided, it was often only because the under-
reported values were balanced by overreported values. This 
balancing-out phenomena was also observed in our experimental 
markets. A larger proportion of subjects bid over expected 
consumer surplus than below. However, this proportion declined 
over repeated market exposure. 
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The results have implications on the mechanism used to 
elicit individual preferences for reduced risk. Traditionally, 
the mechanism is a collective scheme in which an agency 
exogenously reduces a risk if the sum of individual payments 
(i.e., higher taxes, group fund) exceeds the costs of reduction 
(e.g., Weinstein et al. (1980), Smith and Desvousges (1987)]. A 
large number of risks, however, can be reduced privately through 
self-protection or self-insurance mechanisms. By allowing 
private risk reduction, our results indicate that traditional use 
of collective mechanisms may in fact only be a lower bound on the 
economic value of a reduction in risk. 
3.2. overestimation of Low Risks Declines with Repeated Market 
Trials 
To determine if respondents in the experimental asset 
markets overemphasize small probabilities and underemphasize 
large probabilities, we examine the individual's risk preference 
in terms of a risk premium. A risk premium is the amount above 
expected consumer surplus the risk averse individual is willing 
to pay ex ante to eliminate the risk of losing $L of their 
assets. If the individual overemphasizes small probabilities, 
then the risk premium for eliminating a 1% probability of a loss 
should exceed the risk premiums for a 10%, 20% and 40% 
probability. Table 4 reports the summary statistic for the four 
asset markets over the four levels of risk. The individual is 
risk averse (neutral/lover) if the ratio of bid to expected 
consumer surplus is greater (equal to/less) than unity. 
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Respondents were initially extremely risk averse, 
overestimating the 1% probability of a loss in the initial 
inexperienced hypothetical bid. With repeated market exposure 
through ten nonhypothetical trials, however, the overestimation 
declined, especially in the self-insurance markets. Although the 
risk premium for the 1% probability for the self-protection 
experienced hypothetical bids is still larger than the other 
levels of risk, oversensitivity declines rapidly with market 
experience. 8 The result supports Plott and Sunder's (1982) 
argument that for a well-defined, mature market environment, 
expected utility is "not universally misleading about the nature 
of human capabilities and markets" (p. 692). 
The observed tendency to overestimate low probability events 
has led to safety and health regulations that promote hazard 
warnings as regulatory alternatives to direct constraints on use 
or availability [see Viscusi et al. (1986)]. The evidence 
indicates the overall efficacy of hazard warnings is governed not 
only by the risk level, but also by the information content. Our 
experiments indicate that the self-insurance markets disseminated 
information such that consumer valuations were broadly consistent 
with rational behavior. In both the private and collective self-
insurance markets, strict privacy with public information only 
about the market was sufficient to produce rational behavior. 
Irrelevant or nonefficient information was forced out of the 
market. As Hayek (1945) notes, "the most significant fact about 
this (market) system is the economy of knowledge with which it 
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operates, or how little the individual participants need to know 
in order to take the right action ... " [p. 35]. Consequently, 
risk information necessary to induce rational risk valuations may 
well be generated in repeated exposure to risk reduction markets 
that focus on severity. This observation is borne out by 
Brookshire et al. 's (1985) demonstration that expected utility is 
a capable predictor of behavior regarding earthquake hazards and 
self-insurance. 
3.3. Repeated Market Trials Induced Rapid Value Formation 
Coppinger et al. (1980), Coursey et al. (1987) and others 
have noted that a number of trial iterations are required before 
the respondent realizes that revealing "true" values is the 
dominant strategy in a Vickrey or Smith Auction. Therefore, it 
is striking how rapidly respondents adjust their initial 
inexperienced hypothetical bid (UEHB) in all risk reduction 
markets. Learning and adjustment to a dominant strategy occur 
during the first few nonhypothetical trials. The immediate 
feedback environment of the experiments induces rapid value 
formation. 9 
Table 5 illustrates that after the first three trial bids 
(T1 - T3) the remaining trial bids relative to the experienced 
hypothetical bid (EHB) revealed relatively minor adjustments in 
value. Using a one-tailed Wilcoxon Matched-sample test conducted 
at the 95% confidence level, we did not accept the hypothesis 
that the initial inexperienced bid (UEHB) and the EHB bid were 
derived from the identical parental distribution in 87.5% of the 
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cases. The majority of initial UEHB bids differed significantly 
from the final experienced EHB. However, this difference 
decreased substantially with just one or two additional market 
exposures. In the first nonhypothetical market T1, the number of 
cases in which T1 differed significantly from EHB fell to 43.8%. 
In T2, this declined again to 31.3%. Finally, after only three 
trials in the market, in only 6.3% of the cases was the T3 bid 
significantly different from the final EHB bid. The bids in the 
remaining trials T4-T10 remained constant with minor 
fluctuations. 
Although we find that the initial UEHB bid differed 
significantly from the first trial bid T1, the final experienced 
EHB bid did not differ from the first few nonhypothetical trial 
bids. The results indicate that after the initial UEHB bid only 
one or two nonhypothetical trials were needed to induce rapid 
value formation. Consequently, misperception of risk may be a 
potentially damaging bias only if no learning or second-chance 
bid adjustment is allowed to compensate for incorrect prior 
information. 
Traditional fears of risk misperception have originated from 
the static framework used in examining individual behavior under 
risk [see, for example, Lattimore et al. (1988)]. 10 our evidence 
suggests that the static framework does not capture the 
individual's value formation process, which requires additional 
trial periods of market feedback or new information. Sequential 
decisions involving learning [e.g., Viscusi (1979) and Viscusi 
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and Magat (1987)] are more appropriate for examining the 
importance of feedback and value formation in determining 
accurate measures of value (also see Coursey and Schulze (1986)]. 
4. conclusions 
Four alternative risk reduction mechanisms were considered 
in experimental markets to determine how individuals respond to 
and value reduced risk. Our results indicate private selL-
protection provides an upper bound on value, while collective 
self-insurance provides the lower bound. The significant 
differences in value estimates by the four risk reduction 
mechanisms indicate the current focus on collective self-
protection captures only one of four possible values of risk 
reduction. Future attempts to estimate the value of reduced risk 
should consider the other three mechanisms to reveal value. By 
doing so a more comprehensive view of value will be obtained. 
In addition, the four reduction mechanisms with immediate 
market information feedback induced rapid learning and decreased 
misperception of risk. Usually value formation was complete 
after one or two additional market trials. Note, however, the 
robustness of these results declined during the 1% lottery 
period. The addition of repeated trials, however, still induced 
value formation to a degree closer to that predicted by expected 
utility theory, especially in the self-insurance markets that 
focused on the reduction of severity. 
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Footnotes 
1. The experimental design follows that of Schulze et al. 
(1986). Schulze et al., however, only consider one of the four 
markets described in this paper, private self-insurance. 
2. Bennett (1987) found student responses statistically 
insignificant from respondents representative of the general 
population. This suggests experimentation may be 
"satisfactorily performed using student groups" (p. 367). 
3. The experimental parameters were consistent across asset 
markets and lottery periods: initial asset endowment M = $10; 
monetary loss in assets L = $4; and monetary gain in assets G = 
$1. The collective costs for self-protection and self-insurance 
for the respective lottery periods above equaled the sum of 
expected consumer surplus c = $0.3 (1% risk), $3 (10% risk), $6 
(20% risk), and $12 (40% risk). The expected consumer's surplus 
equals the difference between the maximum lottery income (M + G) 
and the expected value of the lottery EV = P(M - L) + (1 - P) (M + 
G). For example, in the 20% lottery period, ES = (10 + 1) -
.2(10 - 4) - .8(10 + 1) = $1. 
4. Forsythe et al. (1982) note the frustrating "open problems 
that are being encountered in almost all experimental work where 
the costs of conducting experiments places a significant 
constraint on the number of observations" (p. 549). Given the 
sample size of n=30 for each asset market, one must heed Forsythe 
et al. 's warning that "statistical tests we report should be 
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regarded more as measures than classical hypothesis tests" (p. 
549) • 
5. Since Vickrey's (1961) initial utilization, the second-price 
auction mechanism has well-known demand revealing properties. 
The subject's dominant strategy is to reveal full preferences 
since the subject does not pay what he or she bid. Incentives 
for false bids do not exist. As Coursey (1987) notes, the use of 
the Vickrey auction allows one to assume "that behavior in 
situations where values are being measured will be well 
approximated in situations where values are induced" [p. 293]. 
As such, the Vickrey auction completes the identification of 
Smith's (1982) triad of components specific to behavior: the 
environment (including values), the instrument or institution, 
and the actual observed behavior. 
6. Communication among subjects is forbidden. The experimenter 
sets the costs $C of 100% risk reduction equal to the sum of 
expected consumer surplus given the lottery period. Costs were 
not posted. The smith Auction process was modified in three 
ways: (i) given a 100% risk reduction, subjects were not asked 
to provide bids for the quantity of collective good, (ii) no 
rebate rule was used, and (iii) there was no stopping rule after 
unanimous agreement; all 12 auctions were completed. 
7. Note this incentive to understate willingness to pay is due 
to the nonhypothetical nature of the ten market trials. The 
subject's take-home pay was determined by his or her bids. In 
hypothetical markets where subjects do not actually pay for 
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protection or insurance, then one might find results to support 
the old notion that individuals overstate their bids to bias the 
results toward certain provision of the public good. Since the 
individuals do not actually pay anything, then they have an 
incentive to overstate their preferences. our results indicate 
that given repeated nonhypothetical market exposure, there was no 
overstating on the final experienced hypothetical bid (EHB) . The 
EHB bid behaved similarly to the nonhypothetical bids (T1-T10). 
8. Kunreuther et al. (1985) noted the substantial empirical 
evidence suggesting individuals are unwilling to insure or 
protect themselves against low probability/high severity events. 
In light of this finding, our results support a notion of 
preference reversal in that the willingness to pay a risk premium 
was the highest for the low probability lottery. Yet apparently 
this behavior is reversed in real-world risks such as seat belts 
and federally subsidized flood insurance [Kunreuther et al. 
(1985)]. 
9. The speed of convergence could be dependent on the parameters 
of the experimental market. However, in other experimental 
contexts, a parameter such as group size has had mixed results in 
altering the speed of convergence. For example, Smith (1982) 
notes that allocations and prices converge to predicted 
competitive equilibrium outcomes within three to four trading 
periods or less. This result holds with as few as six to eight 
buyers and as few as two sellers [Propositions 4 and 5, p. 945]. 
10. Lattimore et al. (1988) found that the expected utility 
19 
model did not fare well in comparison to the probability-
transform model of Yaari (1987). However, their experiment was 
designed as a one~shot decision problem. The subjects did not 
have an opportunity to learn from repeated action in the market. 
consequently, there was no opportunity to update incorrect prior 
perceptions of risk. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Experimental Design 
Experimental Structure 
A. Alternative Risk Reduction 
Mechanisms: 
Private Self-Protection 
Private Self-Insurance 
Collective Self-Protection 
Collective Self-Insurance 
B. Valuation over a Range 
of Risks: 
L=[~, -$L; (1-~), +$G] 
where 
~ = 1%, 10%, 20%, or 40% 
probability of a loss (-$L) 
c. Valuation over Repeated 
Market Trials: 
Inexperienced Hypothetical 
Bid (UEHB) 
Repeated Nonhypothetical 
Bids (Tl-TlO) 
Experienced Hypothetical 
Bid (EHB) 
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Economic Hypotheses 
Does the Risk Reduction 
Mechanism Matter? 
Are individuals indifferent 
to Private versus Collective 
Mechanisms? 
Are individuals indifferent to 
mechanisms that influence 
probability versus severity? 
Do individuals overestimate 
changes in the probability of 
low risk events? 
If so, how does overestimation 
respond to the alternative risk 
reduction mechanisms over 
repeated trials? 
Does repeated exposure to the 
market induce rapid value 
formation for risk reductions? 
Are initial one-shot bids 
significantly different from 
final experienced bids? 
N 
Vl 
TABLE 2 
summary Statistic of Experimental Asset Markets 
for Risk Reduction 
Inexperienced Average Experienced 
Probability Hypothetical Nonhypothetical Hypothetical 
Asset of I!id (UEHB) Bid(ANB) Bid(};;HB) 
Market" A Loss Mean Median Variance Mean Median Variance Mean Median Variance 
l.Self- 1% 2.73 1.50 11.72 0.78 0.38 0.94 0.81 0.35 2.08 
Protection 10% 2.87 3.00 5. 42 1.09 2.98 1.42 1.13 1. 38 4.19 
(Private) 20% 3.35 3.08 5.40 2.93 3.36 1. 49 3.45 3.50 3.80· 
40% 4.62 4.00 7.45 3.93 3.70 2.66 4.37 4.00 4.57 
2. Self- 1% 1.85 0.50 10.35 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03 2.01 
Insurance 10% 2.93 2.28 6.23 1.09 0.79 1.10 1.13 0.86 0.92 
(Private) 20% 3.93 4.00 5.26 2.56 2.16 2.69 2.44 2.25 2.59 
40% 4.91 5.00 5.32 3.35 3. 31 1.81 3.33 3.58 1.87 
3.Self- 1% 2.79 1.00 12.37 0.84 0.06 3.30 0.78 0.06 3.97 
Protection 10% 2.74 2.00 6.57 0.80 0.54 0.60 0.75 0.48 0.89 
(Collect- 20% 2. 77 3.00 3.04 1.27 1. 02 0.89 1. 00 0.90 0.32 
ive) 40% 3.04 3.00 2.39 2.13 2.02 1.46 2.09 2.00 1. 34 
4.Self- 1% 0.97 0.50 2.82 0.77 0.06 7.09 0.78 0.02 0.03 
Insurance 10% 1.25 1.00 1. 03 0.70 0.50 0.77 0.43 0.38 0.20 
(Collect- 20% 1.81 2.00 0.91 1. 26 0.88 2.23 1.11 1. 00 1.21 
ive) 40% 2.55 2.50 2.22 1. 95 1. 41 3.19 1. 73 1. 21 2.14 
"n=30 for each asset market: five experiments with six subjects each. 
NOTE: We do not accept the null hypothesis that the population mean is zero at the 
.01 level using a one-tailed test for all UEHB, ANB, and EHB bids across asset 
markets and lottery periods. 
TABLE 3 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests Between Risk 
Reduction Mechanisms 
Experienced Nonhypothetical Bid CEHB) 
Test 
Market Risk Statistic 
A. Private vs. Collective 
Self-Protection 
Self-Insurance 
B. Self-Protection vs. Self-Insurance 
Private 
Collective 
1% 
1% 
1. 936* 
10% 
20% 
40% 
l% 
10% 
20% 
40% 
l% 
10% 
20% 
40% 
1.702 
10% 
20% 
40% 
3.374* 
5.073* 
4.883* 
0.576 
3.882* 
4.142* 
3.996* 
3.214* 
2.595* 
2.837* 
1. 990* 
1.289 
0.059 
1.718 
* - significant at 95% level that bids were not derived from the same parental 
distribution. 
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Risk 
10% 
20% 
40% 
Asset 
Market 
spb 
SI 
CSP 
CSI 
SP 
SI 
CSP 
CSI 
SP 
SI 
CSP 
CSI 
SP 
SI 
CSP 
CSI 
TABLE 4 
Summary Statistic of Risk Premiums 
Inexperienced 
Hypothetical Bid 
Mean/E[CS) 8 
54. 60c 
37.00 
55.80 
19.40 
5.74 
5.80 
5.48 
2.50 
3.35 
3.93 
2.77 
1.81 
2.31 
2.46 
1.52 
1.28 
Average 
Nonhypothetical Bid 
Mean/E[CSJ 
15.60 
1. 79 
16.84 
15.40 
3.48 
2.18 
1.60 
1.40 
2.93 
2.56 
1. 27 
1. 26 
1. 97 
1. 73 
1. 06 
0.98 
Experienced 
Hypothetical Bid 
Mean/E[CSJ 
16.20 
1.41 
15.52 
1.40 
4.04 
2.26 
1. 51 
0.86 
3.45 
2.44 
1.00 
1.11 
2.19 
1. 67 
1. 04 
0.87 
• - E(CS) represents expected consumer surplus E(CSJ = $1, $.5, $.05, and $2 
for probability = 20%, 10%, 1%, and 40%. 
b SP: Private Self-Protection, SI: Private Self-Insurance 
CSP: Collective Self-Protection, CSI: Collective Self-Insurance 
c- MeanjE(CSJ > 1(=1/ < 1) implies risk aversion (neutrality/lover). 
N 
co 
TABLE 5 
Wilcoxon Matched-Sampled Sign Test Between the Experienced Nonhypothetical 
Bid (EHB) and Bids over the Repeated Market Trials 
Asset 
Market 
Private Self-
Protection 
Private Self-
Insurance 
Collective 
Self-Protection 
Collective 
Self-Insurance 
• - Test Statistic 
Risk l%l 
1 
10 
20 
40 
1 
10 
20 
40 
1 
10 
20 
40 
1 
10 
20 
40 
UEHB 
z• 
-3.111* 
-2~287* 
-0.900 
-0.659 
-3.772* 
-3.945* 
-3.730* 
-3.038* 
-4.076* 
-4.444* 
-4.360* 
-2.550* 
-4.373* 
-4.474* 
-3.712* 
-3.014* 
b - Observed Significance Level 
.00 
.02 
.37 
.51 
.oo 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.01 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Tl 
z p z 
-0.015 .99 
-1.251 .21 
-2.676* .01 -2.490* 
-2.327* .02 -2.798* 
-1.338 .18 
-0.152 . 88 
-1.764 . 08 
-2 .198* . 03 -1.686 
-1.399 .16 
-2.391* .02 -2.277* 
-3.495* .oo -0.699 
-1.069 . 29 
-3.736* .00 -2.877* 
-2.607* .01 -2.184* 
-1.812 .07 
-1.457 .15 
T2 T3 
p z p 
.01 -1.893 .07 
.01 .-3.429* .oo< 
.09 
.02 
.48 
.00 
.03 
-0.744 
-1.448 
-0.209 
.46 
.15 
.83 
c At Trial T6 there was no significant difference at the 95% level (Z = -1.802 and P = .07] 
* - Significant statistical difference at 95% level. 
APPENDIX 
[S-PJ 
Instructions 
General 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. The purpose of the experiment 
is to gain insight into certain features of economic processes. 
If you follow the instructions carefully you can earn money. You 
will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Specific Instructions 
You will be asked to make several decisions. Each decision 
will involve stating your maximum willingness to pay bid to 
eliminate a potential risk. You are not to reveal your bid to 
any other participant. Note that any communication between 
bidders during a trial will result in an automatic loss of $4. 
over the course of the experiment, you will be asked to bid 
your maximum willingness to pay to prevent a loss of $4 for a 
series of different probability periods (40%, 20%, 10%, and 1%). 
For example, given an initial starting income of $10, if there is 
a 60% chance that you will gain $1, and a 40% chance that you 
will lose $4, what is the maximum you would be willing to pay to 
guarantee a 100% chance of winning $1 and a 0% chance of losing 
$4? There will be ten bidding trials in each probability 
period. Note that for each trial the starting income will always 
be $10. Your gains or losses'do not carry over to the next trial 
or probability period. 
Each participant is competing to purchase the right to 
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protect him/herself from a certain probability of a $4 loss. The 
participant with the highest willingness to pay bid wins this 
right of protect~on ~nd will be guaranteed a 0% chance of a $4 
loss and a 100% chance of a $1 gain. The highest bidder must in 
all cases pay the bid of the second highest bidder. All other 
participants are then subject to a random draw to determine if a 
loss or gain occurs. Note that in the event that there is a tie 
for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to rebid. 
The actual experiment will proceed as follows: 
Step 1: At the beginning of the experiment you will state a 
separate hypothetical bid for reducing each of the four 
probabilities of a loss to zero. 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
Step 6: 
The experimenter selects a probability period. 
Ten bidding trials will be run for the selected 
probability period. 
At the beginning of each bidding trial for a given 
probability period, you will state a bid by writing it 
on the recording card. Note that your initial income 
remains at $10 for each trial regardless of your 
winnings or losses in the trial periods before. 
·After the recording card has been collected from each 
participant, the experimenter will display the winner 
(the highest bidder) and the price of protection on the 
blackboard. The winner must pay the displayed price of 
protection. 
The experimenter will then draw one chip from the urn. 
A white chip results in a $1 gain for everyone, a red 
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protect him/herself from a certain probability of a $4 loss. The 
participant with the highest willingness to pay bid wins this 
right of protect~on ~nd will be guaranteed a O% chance of a $4 
loss and a 100% chance of a $1 gain. The highest bidder must in 
all cases pay the bid of the second highest bidder. All other 
participants are then subject to a random draw to determine if a 
loss or gain occurs. Note that in the event that there is a tie 
for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to rebid. 
The actual experiment will proceed as follows: 
step 1: 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
Step 6: 
At the beginning of the experiment you will state a 
separate hypothetical bid for reducing each of the four 
probabilities of a loss to zero. 
The experimenter selects a probability period. 
Ten bidding trials will be run for the selected 
probability period. 
At the beginning of each bidding trial for a given 
probability period, you will state a bid by writing it 
on the recording card. Note that your initial income 
remains at $10 for each trial regardless of your 
winnings or losses in the trial periods before. 
After the recording card has been collected from each 
participant, the experimenter will display the winner 
(the highest bidder) and the price of protection on the 
blackboard. The winner must pay the displayed price of 
protection. 
The experimenter will then draw one chip from the urn. 
A white chip results in a $1 gain for everyone, a red 
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Steo 7: 
Step 8: 
chip results in a $4 loss for everyone (except the 
highest bidder) • 
After ten trial periods, a final hypothetical bid will 
be elicited for the probability period. 
The process will repeat until all four probability 
periods have been examined. Your take home income will 
consist of your initial income plus or minus your 
gains, losses, and purchases of protection. 
Are there any questions? 
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